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A Competitive Framework for Pricing
Interconnection in a Global
Telecommunications Market
MARK A. JAMISON*
In the late 1960s, managers of Ford Motor Company met in California
to watch Ford employees disassemble and reassemble a Toyota truck
- twice. The managers were speechless. American auto makers al-
ways needed rubber mallets to assemble their own cars and trucks be-
cause the parts did not fit. The Ford employees did not once need a
mallet for the Toyota. The managers looked silently at the truck until
the division general manager cleared his throat and said, "The cus-
tomer will never notice." Everyone excitedly nodded assent and left.'
This was a defining event in the decline of the U.S. automobile in-
dustry. Faced with global change in the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. auto-
mobile industry turned inward and continued its traditions of big cars,
poor quality, high prices, and incremental change even though these tra-
ditions no longer matched reality.
These mistakes provide lessons for the telecommunications industry2
and its regulators. In many instances, telecommunications providers and
regulators are holding to traditions of market control, conventional ser-
vices and networks, prices based on cost recovery,3 and incremental
change. These traditions treat competition as the exception and monop-
oly as the norm. As a result, most regulatory issues are about how to regu-
late a monopoly that happens to have some competition, instead of how
to treat a competitive service provider that happens to have a monopoly
in some markets.
* Manager, Regulatory Policy and Coordination, Sprint Communications L.P. Portions
of this paper are adapted from M. Jamison, Impacts of Access Policies on Interexchange
Competition, presentation at the 25th Annual Conference of the Michigan State University
Institute of Public Utilities (December 13, 1993) (available from author). The author would
like to thank Richard Go, Mark Sievers, Peter Stapp, and J. Manning Lee for their helpful
suggestions and information. The author would also like to thank Carol Weinhaus, Sandra
Makeeff, and Dan Harris for numerous discussions on competitive and pricing issues. The
opinions expressed are those of the author. The author is responsible for all errors and
omissions.
1. D. KEARNS & D. NADLER, PROPHETS IN THE DARK 81-2 (1992). This rendition also
appeared in Changes in Technology, paper distributed at the National Association of Regu-
latory Utility Commissioners' Keystone Communications Policy Conference (May 26-28,
1993).
2. From a global perspective, the "telecommunications industry" includes private com-
panies and government owned telecommunications providers.
3. Prices are based on "cost recovery" when prices are designed to cover a service pro-
vider's accounting costs. This is the traditional pricing model in the U.S.
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Treating competition as the norm will be necessary to allow rivalry
and diversity between service providers to build an advanced infrastruc-
ture and new services. Experience has taught us that competition results
in lower costs and in innovations that customers want. Competition is
essential for implementing significant technological changes because it is
difficult for institutions to make fundamental changes to themselves.
4
Also, telecommunications is becoming a commodity to be used by infor-
mation services coming from the publishing, computer, and broadcasting
industries.5 Trying to control information markets by controlling telecom-
munications markets may result in telecommunications playing only a mi-
nor role.
Structural changes in industry and public policy are necessary for
changing the industry paradigms.' The U.S. has used stringent line-of-
business restrictions, such as those in the Modification of Final Judge-
ment (MFJ),' to ensure fair and equal interconnection and access pay-
ments' for competitors. Since 1984, the divested Bell Operating Compa-
nies (BOCs) have had little incentive to favor their former parent, AT&T,
over its interexchange carrier (IXC) rivals. Other countries are using
privatization and liberalization to shift paradigms.
This paper discusses implications of adopting a competitive para-
digm to one public policy issue - prices for interconnection." It refers to
these prices as access charges. Competition has significant implications
for traditional telecommunications pricing because, typically, pricing
problems have been addressed through reallocation of costs - simply
moving money from one place to another. This practice is in conflict with
competition. Cost reallocation results in costs being allocated away from
competitive markets and to noncompetitive services. Implicit in this is
4. Bailey, Price and Productivity Change Following Deregulation: The US Experience,
96 ECON. J. 1, 13-16 (1986); Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Sur-
vey, 12 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 33 (1975); Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reck-
oning for Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1263, 1274 (1993). A related point is
that rapid technological change decreases the desirability of large firms because economies
of scale become less important. See Winston, supra note 4, at 1267.
5. C. WEINHAUS, T. MONROE, ET. AL., THE INFORMATION STUDIO 9-11 (1995).
6. N. TICHY & S. SHERMAN, CONTROL YOUR DESTINY OR SOMEONE ELSE WILL 303 (1993).
For a discussion of utility regulatory reform efforts. see Trebing, Public Control of Enter-
prise: Neoclassical Assault and Neoinstitutional Reform 18 J. EcON. ISSUES 364 (1984).
7. United States v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1336, 1353-7 (D. D.C.
1981) [hereinafter MFJ].
8. "Access" is the U.S. term for interconnection service provided by local telecommuni-
cations carriers to other carriers for completing calls. The prices for this service are called
access charges. Interexchange carriers are the primary customers for access. Traditional lo-
cal exchange carriers are the primary providers of access. This traditional U.S. definition of
access is too restrictive for this paper. For purposes of this analysis, access is the service
provided by any local carrier to other carriers for completing calls or other telecommunica-
tions transmissions.
9. For a general discussion of public policy changes necessary to match the new market
realities, see C. WEINHAUS, T. RALSTON, ET. AL., BREAKING THE MOLD: CHANGING POLICIES TO
MEET CUSTOMER NEEDS (1993).
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that regulated companies do not risk loss as a result of competition -
i.e., they are made whole. This is inconsistent with the profit and loss
mechanisms necessary for effective competition.1"
This paper describes markets and policies in several countries and
draws policy conclusions. The U.S. situation is analyzed in detail. The
first section of this paper describes the current market structures. The
second section describes existing price structures, with particular empha-
sis on the U.S. This section also explains how existing price structures
affect competition. The third section proposes a general structure for ac-
cess pricing that is more consistent with competitive market structures
than are the existing structures. The last section is the conclusion.
I. THE MARKET STRUCTURES FOR INTERCONNECTION
This section describes the market structure for interconnection. Mar-
ket structure refers to the types of companies involved in a market, in-
cluding their sizes, influence, and interactions.
Monopoly is the traditional market structure for local telephone net-
works. Even today, most countries restrict competition in local telecom-
munications. Where competition is allowed, it has only recently been au-
thorized and competitive inroads are modest. As a result, new entrants
seeking interconnection are generally faced with the problem of seeking
interconnection with an incumbent monopoly.
Most countries in Europe still have monopolies for telephone service,
but the trend is to open these markets. The European Union adopted a
directive that all domestic markets are to be opened by 1998. There are
exceptions. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were given an extra five
years to prepare their traditional telephone monopolies for competition.
Belgium and Luxembourg were given two extra years."
The most notable exception to monopolies in Europe is the United
Kingdom (U.K.). The U.K. opened its domestic markets to competition in
1984. At that time, British Telecom (BT) was privatized and a duopoly
market structure was established. The competitor, Mercury Communica-
tions LTD, began operations in 1986. Mercury is owned by Cable & Wire-
less. The duopoly structure did not result in much competition for BT, so
in 1991 the U.K. decided to open markets to more competitors. Today BT
faces competition from at least 50 companies, including U.S. companies,
cable television companies, and electric utilities. Still, BT continues to
dominate the U.K. market - BT's U.K. revenues are nine times larger
than Cable & Wireless's (BT's nearest competitor) revenues in all of
10. See, e.g., C. WEINHAUS, M. JAMISON, ET. AL., NEW WINE AND OLD WINESKINS: MODEL-
ING EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND EXPANDED INTERCONNECTION IN THE LOCAL EXCHANGE 30
(1992).
11. THE YANKEE GROUP, EUROPEAN INFRASTRUCTURE COMPETITION: THE FINAL FRONTIER
ES-1 (1995).
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Europe. 12
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Japan are other countries that
have opened their telecommunications markets to competition. New Zea-
land began its deregulation process in 1987, but the incumbent carrier,
Telecom, still dominates the market. s Clear, Telecom's primary competi-
tor, began operations in 1991 and gained an 18% market share in toll by
the middle of 1993. Clear's and other competitors' entry into local mar-
kets has been slowed by negotiations with Telecom over local intercon-
nection. "' In November 1991, Australia opened its markets for a second
carrier, Optus Communications, to compete with the recently privatized
incumbent, Telecom Australia or Telstra. A third carrier, Vodafone,
started providing mobile services in September 1993. Canada opened its
long distance markets to competition in 1992, but initially limited entry
to only one competitor, Unitel. Japan's telecommunications markets have
been open to competition for several years, but the incumbent carrier,
NTT, still dominates the market."6
U.S. local exchange companies (LECs) also continue to dominate
their local markets even though there are other network providers. Prov-
iders of two-way communications in U.S. local markets include LECs,
competitive access providers (CAPs), and cellular companies. CAPs pro-
vide local fiber optic networks in competition with LECs, although some
CAPs are beginning to install local exchange switches.' The total size of
all local markets in the U.S. in 1993 was $93 billion. 7 LEC local wireline s
revenues were $81.9 billion, all cellular company revenues were $10.8 bil-
lion, and CAP revenues were $350 million.'9
Wireless services and wireline services form separate markets,
0
meaning that customers do not see them as substitutes. LECs have a
12. ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, PROFILE OF THE WORLDWIDE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS INDUSTRY TO 1997 100-104 (3rd ed. 1994);THE YANKEE GROUP, supra note 1.
13. ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 109-10; M. MUELLER, ON THE
FRONTIER OF DEREGULATION: NEW ZEALAND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF IN-
TERCONNECTING COMPETING NETWORKS 11 (1994).
14. MUELLER, supra note 13, at 13-18; Blanchard, Telecommunications Regulation in
New Zealand, 19 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 465-7 (1995).
15. ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 73, 104-5, 108-10.
16. MULTICHANNEL NEWS, ALT. ACCESS INDUSTRY CAPS OFF STRONG YEAR 1 (1994).
17. All currency references to U.S. industry are in U.S. dollars.
18. "Wireline" refers to telecommunications services provided over networks consisting
of fiber optics, copper, coaxial, and microwave facilities. These are also called landline.
"Wireless" refers to radio-based services such as cellular and paging.
19. UNITED STATES TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, 1994 STATISTICS OF THE LOCAL EXCHANGE
CARRIERS FOR THE YEAR 1993 9 (1994); NORTHERN BUSINESS INFORMATION, CELLULAR SER-
VICES REPORT 1994/1995 Exhibit 3-12a (1995); Multichannel News, supra note 16, at 1.
These revenues are not adjusted for CAP access payments to LECs. CAPs pay access
charges to LECs when CAPs connect to LEC networks and when CAPs put traffic on LEC
networks. These access charges are generally significant compared to CAP revenues.
20. Affidavit of Jerry A. Hausman on behalf of the Regional Bell Operating Companies
at 3; MFJ, 525 F. Supp. at 1336.
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strong position in wireless markets where LEC-affiliated cellular compa-
nies accounted for $5.5 billion, or 52%, of cellular revenues in 1993.21
Their largest competitor, AT&T, accounted for 15% of the market.22
LECs had 99.6% of the local wireline market. CAPs had the rest of this
market. For all local markets, LECs had $87.5 billion (combined wireline
and wireless), or a 94% market share. Non-LEC cellular companies had
between 5% and 6% of the combined markets, and CAPs had less than
1%. 23
U.S. LECs also dominant their access markets.24 IXCs are the largest
customers of access. IXCs paid large LECs approximately $20 billion for
access services in 1993.25 CAPs are the primary competitors of large LECs
in this market and had revenues of only $350 million in 1993. "
Market share is only one factor in market dominance. Other factors
include barriers to entry and exit, customer costs for changing suppliers,
21. Personal Communications Services, or PCS, is another form of wireless service. PCS
is like cellular, but has a different place in the radio spectrum and PCS licenses are granted
through auctions. PCS license auctions in the U.S. were completed in March 1995. The
largest winners in the auction were the Sprint-Cable venture, AT&T, PCS Primeco L.P.,
and Pacific Telesis. The Sprint-Cable venture licenses cover 182.4 million people. AT&T's
licenses cover 107.1 million people, PCS Primeco L.P.'s licenses cover 57.2 million people,
and Pacific Telesis's licenses cover 31.0 million. The Sprint-Cable venture includes Sprint,
TeleCommunications Inc., Comcast Corporation, and Cox Communications. PCS Primeco
L.P. includes Nynex, Bell Atlantic, Air Touch Communications (the former Pacific Telesis
cellular company), and U.S. West. On average, purchasers of PCS licenses paid $15.54 per
person for the licenses. These companies are now in the process of building their PCS
networks.
22. This includes all BOC-affiliated cellular companies and GTE. Pacific Telesis's
divested cellular operations are not included even though this new company operates in
alliance with other BOC cellular companies. Sprint's cellular company is also excluded be-
cause Sprint's IXC operations are comparable in size to Sprint's LEC operations. Also,
Sprint is spinning off its cellular operations.
23. These revenue figures include cellular long distance revenues. Except in cases when
cable television companies also own CAPs, cable television companies are not included in
these numbers because they are only beginning to provide two-way communications. Cellu-
lar revenues are not adjusted for access payments to LECs. These payments are generally
small compared to cellular revenues.
24. Access markets are not independent of other local markets. Access is simply one
type of transmission on a local network that provides numerous other services, including
local exchange service. As a result, competition in access markets is necessarily tied to com-
petition for local networks in general.
25. Large LECs received $20.9 billion in access revenues in 1993. Large LECs are LECs
that have more than $100,000,000 in annual revenues. 47 C.F.R. § 32.11(a)(1) (1994). Large
LECs also paid $1.3 billion in access expenses in 1993, primarily to smaller LECs. FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1993/1994 STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS
31, 35, 39 (1993).
26. The other competitors in this market are primarily the IXCs themselves. IXCs may
use their own facilities or customer-provided facilities to avoid using LEC access services.
Public data are not available on the extent of IXC-provided and customer-provided access;
however, the amount should be smaller than CAP-provided access because CAPs should
have scale economies that stand-alone IXC-provided and customer-provided access would
not have.
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and control of essential or bottleneck facilities. Indeed, these market
share data may overstate LECs' future market power because in 1993
very few states allowed CAPs and others to compete with LECs. This is
changing. Once legal, technological, and economic barriers to entry are
removed, LECs should lose some of their control over local markets. This
expectation is reflected in projections that CAP revenues will grow sub-
stantially in the next few years. Consultant estimates vary greatly, but
put future CAP revenues in the range of $1 billion by 1996 to $10 billion
by 1999.s"
II. ACCESS PRICES AND COMPETITION
This section describes problems with existing telecommunications
pricing. The U.S. access price structures and pricing subsidies are de-
scribed in detail. Next, this section explains how these U.S. prices are
inconsistent with competitive markets. Lastly, this section describes how
these pricing problems also exist in other countries.
A. U.S. Price Structures for Access
The U.S. price structures for access vary depending on the type of
service and the type of customer. There are two types of access -
switched access and dedicated access. Switched access applies to calls
that go through a LEC local switch." Dedicated access is a dedicated line
between the customer and the carrier.
Access is paid by IXCs, cellular carriers, enhanced service providers
(ESPs)29 and potentially by new competitors in the local exchange. LECs
may also pay access for long distance services that they provide. The ac-
cess charges for these types of access customers are:
1. IXCs.
IXCs pay access charges to LECs on both ends of long distance
calls 0 - on the originating end of the call if the customer placing
the call uses a LEC network (e.g., a local telephone line), and on
the terminating end of the call if the customer receiving the call
receives it via a LEC network.
2. Cellular.
Cellular carriers pay access charges only when they send calls (i.e.,
terminate calls) into a LEC network. Cellular carriers do not origi-
27. THE YANKEE GROUP, A CAP MARKET UPDATE: No FUTURE FOR THE INDEPENDENTS?
61 (1993); MULTICHANNEL NEWS, supra note 16, at 1.
28. A local switch is used to connect customers together for local calls, and to connect
customers to long distance networks to place and receive long distance calls.
29. ESPs are companies that provide information services, primarily over data
networks.
30. The calls may be local calls in some instances, but customers would generally be
charged long distance prices for these local calls.
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nate calls on LEC networks.
3. ESPs.
ESPs are treated like business local service customers. ESPs pay
the same prices for interconnection that normal business custom-
ers pay.
4. New local competitors.
Charges paid by new competitors in local exchanges are still in the
developmental stage. Some companies propose that new local ex-
change carriers be treated like existing LECs which generally do
not charge each other for exchanging traffic." This is called a biil-
and-keep arrangement. Some traditional LECs propose that new
local exchange carriers pay existing IXC access prices. Others pro-
pose that lower prices be used. It is too early in the process to
determine how U.S. regulators will ultimately resolve these issues.
5. LECs.
In some instances, a LEC may also pay access to other LECs when
the LEC is acting as a long distance carrier. Generally, the LEC
long distance carrier pays the same prices as IXCs, but there are
exceptions. In some instances, the LEC will simply share its long
distance revenues with other LECs instead of paying access
charges. This arrangement is called a toll pool. In arrangements
called extended area service, calls that would otherwise be long
distance calls are treated as local exchange calls. With extended
area service, the LECs generally do not charge their customers
long distance prices, and the LECs do not charge each other for
completing the calls. In other instances, the LEC long distance
carrier may develop a contract with other LECs that give the LEC
long distance carrier special prices for access services.
IXCs pay the highest switched access prices. IXCs pay LECs for
processing calls through the LECs' local switches (called Local Switch-
ing), for carrying calls from the local switch to the IXCs' networks (called
Local Transport), and for allowing use of the lines that connect customers
to LEC local switches (called Carrier Common Line Charge or CCLC).32
31. See, e.g., G. BROCK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERCONNECTION (April 1995).
32. The CCLC is the largest component of access, approximately $6.6 billion to $7.1
billion annually nationwide, including Long Term Support (LTS). (LTS is an amount col-
lected by some large LECs through their CCLCs, and transferred to some small LECs. LTS
is approximately $323 million annually.) The next largest component is the Residual Inter-
connection Charge (RIC), which is estimated to be approximately $3.8 billion annually if
implemented by all jurisdictions. The RIC resulted from an allocation of costs away from
LEC Local Transport markets that are becoming competitive. Together, the CCLC and the
RIC make up approximately 45% of all access charges collected by LECs. Amounts are from
M. SiEvERs, ACCESS SUBSIDIES, LONG DISTANCE COMPETITION AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE
INTERLATA RESTRICTION 10 (February 23, 1994); Comments of the United Telephone Asso-
1995
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The prices for IXC switched access are generally regulated and contained
in LEC tariffs on file with regulatory commissions. Cellular carriers do
not pay CCLC. In addition, access prices charged to cellular carriers are
generally kept in contracts rather than tariffs.
Access prices are generally marked up far above the cost of providing
access. According to a study sponsored by the United States Telephone
Association, the costs to LECs for providing IXC access services is ap-
proximately $0.026 per minute. LEC revenues from IXC access services
are approximately $0.1053 per minute.38 This means the mark-up in these
access prices is approximately 300%.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize access price structures. Table 1 describes
which kinds of carriers pay access to other carriers. The column on the
left lists retail service providers. Retail service providers are carriers that
are providing service directly to the retail customers. The other three col-
umns show who retail providers pay for access. For example, Table 1
shows that IXCs pay access to traditional LECs, pay no access to cellular
carriers, and generally pay access to new local carriers.
Table 1. Who Pays Who for Access Services in the U.S.
Receiving Carriers: Wholesale Network Providers
Paying Carriers:
Retail Service
Providers Traditional LEC Cellular New Local Carrier
IXC Yes No Yes'
Traditional LEC -
Local No No Too early to tell
Traditional LEC -
Long Distance Traditional LEC Cellular New Local Carrier
Traditional LEC -
Extended Area Serv. No No Too early to tell
New LEC Varies No Too early to tell
ESP Yes N/A Too early to tell
Cellular Yes No Too early to tell
ciation, In the Matter of Amendments to Part 36 of the Commission's Rules and Establish-
ment of a Joint Board, CC Docket No. 80-286, Notice of Inquiry, Attachment 1 (October 28,
1994). Rules can be found in 47 C.F.R. §§ 69.108, 69.111, 69.124, 69.501, 69.603, 69.612
(1994).
33. C. MONSON & J. ROHLFS, THE $20 BILLION IMPACT OF LOCAL COMPETITION IN TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS app. 2 (1993).
34 This is true for CAPs. It is too early to tell what the pattern will be for new local
service competitors.
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Table 2 outlines the kinds of prices carriers pay to LECs for access
services and when these prices are paid. The first column lists paying car-
riers. The paying carrier is the retail service provider. The next two col-
umns show which access prices are paid. The middle column indicates
that some prices are tariffed. The column on the right indicates that some
prices are under contract, which means that prices may vary among cus-
tomers. Table 2 also differentiates between prices paid for originating
calls and terminating calls. The top portion of Table two shows payments
for calls that originate in LEC networks. The bottom portion shows pay-
ments for calls that terminate in LEC networks. If calls both originate
and terminate in LEC networks, both payments are made.
Table 2. Who Pays What for LEC Access Services in the U.S.
Paying Carriers: Retails Service Prices Paid to LECs
Providers Tariffed Contract
FOR ORGINATING CAuLs
IXC CCLC, LS, LT Rare
Cellular NA (See Note 1) NA (See Note 1)
New LEC Varies(See Note 2) Varies (See Note 2)
ESP Local service N/A
Traditional LEC for
long distance Generally CCLS, LS, LT Sometimes (See Note 3)
local No charge No charge
extended area service No charge No charge
FoR TmMINATINO CaLs
IXC CCLC, LS, LT Rare
Cellular Rare LS, LT
New LEC Varies (See Note 2) Varies (See Note 2)
ESP Local service N/A
Traditional LEC for.
long distance Generally CCLC, LS, LT Sometimes (See Note 3)
local No charge No charge
extended area service No charge No charge
Acronyms:
CCLC Carrier Common Line Charge. Charged for use of lines that connect customers to LEC local
switches.
LS Local Switching. Charged for processing calls through LECs' local switches.
LT Local Transport. Charged for carrying calls from an LEC's local switch to the IXC's network.
Notes:
1. All cellular retail services originate on cellular networks.
2. Access arrangements vary for new LECs vary. Sometimes they are treated like traditional LECs,
and there are no charges. This is called bill and keep. At other times, special prices are developed
either through negotiation or by tariff. Some LECs propose to charge IXC access prices to new
LECs.
3. Some LEC long distance carriers share toll revenues with LECs instead of paying access. Sometimes
LEC long distance carriers negotaite access prices with other LECs.
Access prices vary with regulatory jurisdiction. Calls that originate
and terminate in the same state are called intrastate calls. State public
utility commissions regulate the access prices for intrastate calls, and
prices vary from state to state. Calls that cross state boundaries are called
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
interstate. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates ac-
cess prices for interstate calls.8 5 ESPs are the exception to this arrange-
ment. The FCC allows ESPs to purchase state local exchange service and
use that service to originate and terminate interstate calls.
B. Subsidies in the U.S. System
The current U.S. regulatory pricing system is based on cost allocation
and cost recovery: LECs record their costs according to regulatory ac-
counting rules, allocate these costs among services and jurisdictions, and
then recover the costs through prices.3 6
This cost allocation system contains numerous subsidies or support
mechanisms that are often associated with universal service. 7 Many of
the mechanisms are explicit and can be quantified. Others, such as charg-
ing averaged prices to both high cost and low cost customers, are more
nebulous.
Almost all of the explicit subsidies are funded by prices for access
services. There are three basic types of explicit subsidies:"
1. Credits to customer bills
Federal and state Lifeline Assistance programs provide approxi-
mately $165 million annually to LEC low income customers.
2. Payments to targeted LECs
Approximately $984 million in subsidies are targeted to small
LECs and high-cost LECs annually.
3. Untargeted subsidies
Most of the subsidies are provided without any qualifying criteria
or targeting. These are $10.1 billion to $10.5 billion annually.
Table 3 provides details on how these subsidy mechanisms work. The
mechanisms are categorized according to the three types. The first col-
umn lists the names of the subsidy mechanisms. The next column shows
the size of the mechanism, on an annual basis, in the 1993-1994 time
frame. The middle column shows which type of carrier pays the subsidy.
The next column lists who gets the subsidy. The last column describes
35. C. WEINHAUS & A. OETTINGER, BEHIND THE TELEPHONE DEBATES 49-50 (1988).
36. Id. at 33-69. Federal policies are defined in 47 C.F.R. §§ 32, 36, 65, 69 (1994).
37. For purposes of this paper, a financial support mechanism or subsidy is defined as
any payment that would not exist if networks were unbundled and fully competitive, and/or
if government regulations did not require the payments. Also in this paper, unbundled
means that local loops, switching, and local transport are purchased separately.
38. Amounts are from M. Sievers, supra note 32, at 10; Comments of the United States
Telephone Association, supra note 32, at Attachment 1. Table 3 provides a summary of the
amounts. For an explanation of these systems, see generally C. WEINHAUS, S. MAKEEFF, ET.
AL., WHO PAYS WHOM? CASH FLOW FOR SOME SUPPORT MECHANISMS AND POTENTIAL MODEL-
ING OF ALTERNATIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES (1992).
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how the payments get from the payer to the recipient.
Table 3 shows that these explicit subsidies make up approximately
50% of the access payments by IXCs. Sievers and Monson-Rohlfs esti-
mate that all subsidies make up 60% to 75% of access payments by
IXCs. s "
Table 3. How the Explicit Subsidies in Access Work in the U.S.'0
Credits to Customers' Bills
Subsidy Amount Who Pays Who Gets How Dollars Move
Lifeline/Linkup $165 million IXCs Low income N IXC pays per presubscribed line
customers N Customer receives credit on bill
Payments to Targeted LECs
Subsidy Amount Who Pays Who Gets How Dollars Move
Universal Service $725 million IXCs LECs with high U IXC pays per presubscribed line
Fund loop costs U LEC receives based on loop costs
Long Term $323 million IXCs and Small LECs U IXC pays to large LECs
Support (LTS) CAPs in U Large LECs send dollars to small LECs based
large-LEC on loop costs
exchanges
Dial Equipment $259 million IXC low Small LECs U IXC pays to medium-size LECs
Minutes Weighting cost U Medium-size LECs send to small LECs based
customers on size and switch costs
Untargeted Subsidies
Subsidy Amount Who Pays Who Gets How Dollars Move
Carrier Common $6.3 - 6.7 IXCs and LECs E IXC pays per minute of access
Line (less LTS) billion CAPs U LEC receives per minute of access
(nationwide)
Residual $3.8 billion IXCs and LECs U IXC pays per minute of access
Interconnection (nationwide) CAPs U LEC receives per minute of access
Charge (less
tandem)
C. Effects of U.S. Access Price Structures on Competition
The current U.S. system for pricing access services hinders competi-
tion in four ways. First, the system gives LECs the opportunity and in-
centive to harm competition in downstream markets. Downstream mar-
kets are markets that rely upon local networks as an input for producing
a final product or service. Long distance is an example of a downstream
market and will be used to describe this effect. The second effect of the
current system is that it hinders LECs' ability to compete in access mar-
kets that are subject to competition. The third way that the current ac-
cess system harms competition is that it discriminates against some types
of companies and in favor of others. The fourth way is that is provides
39. M. Sievers, supra note 32, at 1; C. Monson & J. Rohlfs, supra note 33, at app. 2.
40. Rules can be found in 47 C.F.R. §§ 36.125, 36.601-.741, 69.108, 69.111, 69.116-.117,
69.124, 69.501, 69.603, 69.612 (1994). Sources of amounts are M. Sievers, supra note 32, at
10; Comments of the United States Telephone Association, supra note 32, at Attachment 1.
1995
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
opportunities for arbitrage.
The current pricing system for access services can hinder inter-
exchange competition for two reasons: (1) the high mark-up above cost
gives LECs the ability and incentive to vary prices among IXCs; and (2)
access is the largest cost that IXCs have for providing their services.
LECs have the ability to vary access prices among IXCs because ac-
cess prices are high compared to the underlying costs - the mark-up
above cost is 300% according to the United States Telephone Association
study. This high mark-up gives LECs the ability to have wide variances
in the access prices they charge to different customers. For example, a
LEC could offer a 50% discount to select access customers and still have
a 100% mark-up above cost. In this instance, the price difference between
customers would be large, but all access prices would still be profitable to
the LEC.
LECs have an incentive to discount access prices to select customers
in at least three situations: (1) when competition has entered only some
access markets (discussed later in this section); (2) if these select custom-
ers are large enough to exert buying power on the LECs;4'1 and (3) if the
customer is the LEC itself.42 LECs have begun advocating volume dis-
counts for access services. This could be a response to buying power of
some access customers, an effort to discourage large customers from using
competitors by lowering the marginal price of access, 4s or both. LECs also
have an incentive to reflect lower mark-ups in their own prices for long
distance - i.e., when the LEC is its own access customer. These lower
mark-ups would allow LECs to gain greater market share in downstream
markets. Ameritech once proposed this as part of its plan to enter the
interLATA long distance market.4 4
Varying access prices between customers in downstream markets can
harm competition if access is a significant cost to the downstream com-
petitors. This is the case for interexchange markets. Access payments to
LECs are approximately 45% of IXCs' cost of providing long distance
41. The ability to exert market power as a buyer is known in economics as monopsony
power (when there is only one buyer) or oligopsony power (when there is more than one
buyer). K. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM 267 (2nd ed. 1975).
42. LECs also have an incentive to charge different access prices between markets
where LEC costs for access are different. However, this generally would have no uneconomic
effect on competitive markets and so is not discussed in this paper.
43. The "marginal price" of access refers to the price for additional access minutes. For
example, if the price per minute for access was $0.05 for the first 1 million minutes, and
$0.03 for minutes beyond 1 million, the marginal price would be $0.03 for a customer buying
more than 1 million minutes.
44. The Wall Street Journal (Midwest Edition), December 7, 1993, at A3. The MFJ
divided the U.S. into 160 local access transport areas or LATAs. Under the terms of the
MFJ, BOCs are generally prohibited from carrying calls across LATA boundaries. (MFJ,
552 F. Supp. at 229, §IV.(K).) Ameritech's plan allows competition in its local markets in
exchange for being allowed to carry interLATA calls.
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services.'5 Indeed, access is the single most significant determining factor
of IXCs' cost structures. If LECs were to give one IXC the 50% price
discount described above, this carrier would have a 22.5% artificial cost
advantage over its competitors. Since IXC margins are only 11% on aver-
age,' 6 the IXC with the advantage may easily dominate the market. If
LECs were to give discounts down to the price of a common form of dedi-
cated access called DS1, the artificial cost advantage would be over
40% .47
The high mark-ups in access prices also make it difficult for LECs to
compete in access markets where there is effective competition. New busi-
nesses tend to enter markets first where mark-ups are highest and cus-
tomer concentration is the greatest. This is how the U.S. telephone indus-
try first developed in the late 1800s, and is how CAPs have entered the
access market.4 According to a 1993 Bellcore survey, requests from CAPs
and others to locate facilities in LEC central offices " were concentrated
in only 14% of LEC offices, but these offices addressed nearly 80% of all
IXC access traffic. 0 This exposure - high access prices in densely popu-
lated markets - puts LECs in a bad competitive posture should access
markets become competitive.
LECs face difficulties in responding to this competition. A natural
reaction for LECs will be to vary access prices between competitive and
non-competitive areas."' This reaction faces some regulatory hurdles be-
cause it runs counter to the traditional regulatory practice of charging
high prices in urban areas to cover costs of services in rural areas. Be-
cause of this practice, LEC costs in general in rural areas are 35% higher
than LEC revenues in rural areas.5 2 When IXC costs are included, costs
in rural areas are 39% higher than LEC and IXC revenues." So ending
this regulatory practice could result in higher rural prices for telecommu-
45. Weinhaus, Ralston, et. al., supra note 9, at 16.
46. SIEVERS, supra note 32, at 16.
47. Estimate of DS1 price is $500 per month. C. WEINHAUS, T. PITTS, ET. AL., BEYOND
FUTURE SHOCK: THE NEED FOR A NEW REGULATORY RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 17
(November 13, 1993). Minutes are assumed to be 9600 per month. DS1 is a dedicated circuit
capacity that is equal to 24 simultaneous voice calls.
48. Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction 17 TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POL. 352, 356-7 (July 1993); THE YANKEE GROUP, A CAP MARKET UPDATE,
supra note 27, at 6-17.
49. A central office is the place where local telephone lines connect to a LEC telephone
switch.
50. F. W. NOLTE, LETTER TO R.O. CAULKINS (July 19, 1993).
51. LECs have been allowed to do this in some instances through a policy called "zone
density pricing". This policy allows LECs to deaverage some access prices according to
whether a market falls into a high density, medium density, or low density zone. "Density"
in this case refers to the density of telephone usage in the area. See, e.g., Transport Rate
Structure and Pricing, CC Docket No. 91-213, 7 FCC Rcd 7006 (1992).
52 C. WEINHAUS, S. MAKEEFF, ET. AL., REDEFINING UNIVERSAL SERVICE: THE COST OF
MANDATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN RURAL AREAS 10 (1994).
53. C. WEINHAUS, S. MAKEEFF, ET. AL., WHAT IS THE PRICE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE? IM-
PACT OF DEAVERAGING NATIONWIDE URBAN/RURAL RATES 11 (1993).
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nications services. 54
Another LEC response could be to lower access prices, but this hin-
ders LEC profitability. Access charges provide over 25% of LEC revenues
on a nationwide basis.55 And much of the mark-up in access prices re-
sulted from allocations of local exchange line costs to access and long dis-
tance services. So from the perspective of traditional regulatory account-
ing, large and unilateral decreases in access prices could have large,
negative impacts on LEC profits. For the time being, the need for a LVC
pricing response is dampened somewhat because CAPs also pay access
charges to LECs."
The third way that the current access system is inconsistent with
competitive markets is that the system discriminates against some types
of companies and in favor of other types - the system has different pric-
ing arrangements for different types of customers. Tables 1 and 2 illus-
trate this. Prices are different for IXC access and cellular access. New
local carriers may pay a third set of prices. LEC retail customers (i.e.,
residential and business customers) pay yet another sets of prices, and
ESPs pay the same as the business retail customers. Also, LECs receive
special pricing treatment from other LECs for local service, extended area
service, and sometimes long distance service.
Tables 1 and 2 also illustrate that there are differences in when ac-
cess is paid. For example, IXCs pay access when their customers use LEC
networks to complete calls, and cellular carriers pay access to a LEC
when a cellular customer calls a customer that is connected to the LEC
network. However, a LEC pays no access to a cellular carrier when a LEC
customer calls a cellular customer. 5 Also, traditional LECs generally pay
nothing to each other when they complete local and extended area service
calls - i.e., they have a bill-and-keep arrangement. As was indicated
above, it is too early to tell whether new local competitors will also have
bill-and-keep arrangements with traditional LECs, or have some other
payment arrangement.
The fourth reason that the U.S. access system is inconsistent with
competition is that it gives companies an incentive to arbitrage between
the different access pricing plans. For example, some IXCs provide wire-
less services such as cellular. These IXCs pay IXC access charges to LECs
for long distance calls, and pay the lower cellular access prices to LECs
54. The FCC has begun allowing LECs to vary access prices between urban and rural
areas. 47 C.F.R. § 69.123.
55. WEINHAUS, RALSTON, ET. AL, supra note 9, at 16.
56. For switched access, CAPs pay basically the same access charges that an IXC would
- CCLC, RIC, Local Switching, and either a collocation fee or an entrance facility fee.
57. LECs have been ordered by the FCC to pay cellular companies for terminating
calls. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act Regulatory
Treatment of Mobile Services, Federal Communications Commission GN Docket No. 93-




for cellular calls. It would be difficult for LECs to know if an IXC is pay-
ing the appropriate price for terminating calls if the IXC were to combine
its long distance and cellular trunks for terminating calls.56
LECs have the same problem with interconnection with new LECs.
New LECs may have the ability to terminate both long distance and local
calls on the same trunks. The LEC would want to charge long distance
access prices for the long distance calls and local access prices (which may
be lower) for local calls, but may not be able to distinguish between the
calls. Some LECs propose to remedy this problem by having the same
access prices for long distance and local calls. However, if reciprocal, this
arrangement creates the incentive for new LECs to encourage customers
to originate calls through the LEC and terminate calls through the new
LEC. If successful, this would force LECs to pay high termination prices
to new LECs for local calls that LECs would normally have terminated on
their own networks. The new LECs would pay little or no local access
prices to the LEC because customers would be originating calls through
the LEC, not the new LEC.
Pricing schemes based on the identity of the customer can continue
only as long as LECs have sufficient market power to control prices, can
limit resale of LEC services, and can identify calls as being local, long
distance, intrastate, or interstate. As the numbers and types of alternative
networks continue to increase, LECs are likely to lose much of this
ability.
D. Price Structures in Other Countries
It is generally recognized that other countries face pricing issues sim-
ilar to those in the U.S.5 9 Telstra's revenues for providing long distance
service were over seven times cost in 1987-1988, the last year for which
disaggregated data were available. Even on a fully allocated cost basis, 0
Telstra's long distance revenues were 2.5 times cost in 1989-1990, and its
local service charges covered only 70% of their costs. Also during 1989-
1990, France Telecom's long distance revenues were nearly 4 times their
fully allocated costs, and local service charges covered only 50% of their
costs.,,
A cross-country comparison by Datapro shows that similar pricing
problems exist in the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand. s" Datapro compares
58. A trunk is a circuit that carries telecommunications traffic (voice, data, or video)
between locations. In this case, the trunk connects an IXC's network to a LEC's network.
59. See, e.g., H. Hefekiuser, The Universal Service Principle in a Competitive Market,
in PROCEEDINGS: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS 123-6 (S. Farnoux-To-
porkoff & M. Botein eds. 1994); DATAPRO, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR THE LOCAL Loop? (1992).
60. Fully allocated cost is a process of allocating accounting costs to services. All over-
heads and common costs are allocated. In most cases, loop costs are also allocated between
local services and long distance services rather than directly assigned to local services.
61. DATAPRO, supra note 59, at 1-2.
62. Id. at 2.
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local service charges to long distance charges for 1988-1989. According to
Datapro, correct pricing would result in local service charges that are ap-
proximately 30 times the price of a 5-minute long distance call of 300-500
kilometers. In contrast to this optimal price relationship, the local-to-
long-distance price ratio was 15:1 to 19:1 in the U.K., 4.2:1 in Japan, and
6.9:1 in New Zealand. Indeed, Telecom cut long distance prices 35-50%
and raised local service prices 33% in anticipation of Clear entering the
New Zealand long distance market. Once Clear entered the market, long
distance prices decreased another 14% for small customers and 20-25%
for large customers."
International communications services have similar pricing problems.
Domestic telecommunications carriers receive payments from interna-
tional carriers for calls that terminate in domestic carriers' respective
countries. These payments are based on "accounting rates" that are nego-
tiated between countries. Costs for international calls have declined, but
the accounting rates have not kept pace. Accounting rates for calls be-
tween the U.S. and Western Europe countries are 2 to 7 times actual
costs, between the U.S. and Japan are 3-4 times cost, and between the
U.S. and Canada are 90% above cost. 4 The FCC and others have tried to
put downward pressure on these accounting rates by advocating resale of
international services and alternate calling procedures such as callback."
Prices in these countries will create problems similar to those found
for the U.S. High long distance prices would generally make it difficult for
incumbents to effectively compete with new entrants. On the other hand,
if the high usage prices are passed on to the new entrants in the form of
high access charges, their ability to compete would be diminished.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ACCESS
Section II explained mismatches between the existing structure for
access and competition. This section describes an alternative structure for
access that is consistent with the development of competitive markets.
Other policies that may be important for competition are not discussed.
To remedy the mismatches between competition and the existing ac-
cess policies, a new access structure should be developed based on these
principles:
1. Non-discrimination
Prices and services should be available to customers without
discrimination as to who the customer is nor what the cus-
63. MUELLER, supra note 13, at 11-2.
64. J. Haring, J. Rohlfs, & H. Shooshan III, The U.S. Stake in Competitive Global
Telecommunications Services: The Economic Case for Tough Bargaining 4-5 (December 16,
1993) (copy available from Strategic Policy Research, 7500 Old Georgetown Rd., Suite 810,
Bethesda, MD 20814).
65. THE YANKEE GROUP, INTERNATIONAL SIMPLE RESALE: OPENING UP THE MARKET FOR
INTERNATIONAL LONG DISTANCE 1-3 (1995).
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tomer does with the traffic.
2. Modularity
As competition increases, regulators should be able to easily
change and remove pricing constraints without causing dis-
locations, such as in universal service policies.
3. Low mark-ups
Low mark-ups of price above incremental cost limit the po-
tential for price discrimination and cross-subsidy.
4. Flexibility
Carriers should have the ability to lower prices and intro-
duce more innovative price structures to respond to
competition.
This section describes an alternative access structure that conforms
to these principles. This access structure is described under the headings
of non-discrimination, modularity, low mark-ups, and flexibility. Even
though this structure is described under separate headings, it should be
viewed as a single proposition. Some of the pieces of this structure may
not make sense if they are separated from the whole.
The access policies in this section assume that the identities of tradi-
tional industry categories - LEC, IXC, cellular, cable television, etc. -
will blur if not go away over time. Customers will receive services from
service integrators. These companies will purchase network and service
functions from other providers, and may or may not own their own net-
works and service functions." This industry structure means that almost
all network companies will provide wholesale services to service integra-
tors, and may also provide retail services to end-use customers.
The access policies are described next.
A. Non-discrimination Policies
Non-discrimination is necessary to facilitate competition and to pro-
vide carriers with a pricing structure that is easy to administer. An access
policy with a single wholesale pricing system and common carrier obliga-
tions would satisfy the non-discrimination principle. The wholesale pric-
ing system would allow retail service providers to purchase network func-
tions and usage for collecting traffic from customers, distributing traffic to
end-use customers and other networks, and transporting traffic between
specific points. These wholesale services would be available to any cus-
tomer who was willing to accept the billing, engineering, etc., obligations
of a network provider. The common carrier obligation would prohibit a
66. See generally E. Noam, Beyond Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to
the System of Systems 18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 286 (1994). For an explanation of how
this industry structure would work, see generally WEINHAUS, MONROE, Er. AL., supra note 5.
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company from refusing to connect with customers except for normal busi-
ness reasons, such as bill payment problems.
B. Modularity Policies
Modularity means that access policies are not interwoven between
markets and with other regulatory policies such as universal service. This
provides regulators with an exit strategy - i.e., markets that become
competitive can be deregulated without changing regulations for other
markets and for other policies.
A modular system for regulating prices should have two features: (1)
price caps that the regulated company cannot manipulate; and (2) mar-
ket-by-market prices. The price caps should be set in the regulatory pro-
cess and have little reliance on data and studies that are under the con-
trol of the regulated company. Such a price cap can be determined at
least two ways. One way is to use standardized cost or financial models to
estimate what it should cost to provide access services in different types
of markets. These models would serve as guides or formulae for adjusting
access prices over time. Another method would be to link prices in non-
competitive markets to prices in competitive markets. Current rate-of-
return regulation should not be used because it provides companies with
incentives and opportunities to cross-subsidize and increase costs. Ex-
isting price cap systems would also be inappropriate because their formu-
lae and indices are based upon the regulation of entire companies, not
just a limited set of services such as access and basic telephone services.
Regulating price caps on a market-by-market basis means that the
maximum prices are set for each market. Once the market is deregulated,
the price cap can be removed without creating the need for adjustments
to any other pricing systems or other regulatory policies.
The modularity principle also means that universal service policies
should not be funded through access prices.8 7 A competitively neutral
mechanism should be developed that provides subsidies that are:
1. Based on customer need8
Payments should be based on customer's to afford basic
services.
2. Limited in size to what customers and service providers
needs9
67. For examples of regulatory tools that could be used to revise subsidy systems, see
generally C. WEINHAUS, T. MONROE, ET. AL., UNIVERSAL SERVICE TOOL KIT, PART 1: GETTING
FRoM HERE TO THERE: TRANSITIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING SUBSIDIES (1994).
68. This does not necessarily preclude subsidies for infrastructure. Infrastructure subsi-
dies may be needed if the public policy is that infrastructures should be deployed even if
customers do not value them sufficiently to pay for them through prices, or cannot pay for
them because of income or business limitations.
69. For an example of how this could be done, see C. WEINHAUS, T. MONROE, ET. AL.,
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Payments to support affordability of basic services should
be based on the difference between the price the targeted
customers can pay and the amount of revenue that a service
provider needs to remain financially viable. This amount of
revenue can be determined from market prices for services
if markets are competitive, or benchmark costs. Benchmark
costs are estimates of the economic costs of providing basic
services."0 The support payments can be provided either to
providers of basic services or to customers.
3. Nondiscriminatory
All providers of basic services should be treated equally with
respect to how their services are subsidized.
4. Funded in a way that does not hinder competition
Funding mechanisms should not disadvantage competitors
that would be viable absent the subsidy mechanism. Fund-
ing based on telecommunications revenues net of payments
to intermediary telecommunications providers is an example
of such a mechanism.
C. Low-mark-ups Policies
The low-mark-up principle means that the mark-up of access prices
above direct or incremental cost should be comparable to the mark-ups
for other services.7 1 Access prices should make a contribution to joint and
common costs to allow network providers to be financially viable.7 2 How-
ever, an unusually high mark-up permits the price discrimination de-
scribed in the previous section, and facilitates cross-subsidy. The low
mark-up could be achieved through direct regulatory oversight of prices.
Regulators could generate or obtain estimates of costs for access services
and adjust price caps so as to limit the emount of mark-up. Extensive
resale may also facilitate low markups/s
UNIVERSAL SERVICE TOOL KIT, PART 2: BEYOND COST ALLOCATIONS: BENCHMARK SUBSIDY
METHOD (1994).
70. These estimates would not be specific to any company, but would be representative
of companies that are in the market. These economic costs should include incremental costs
for basic services and a portion of joint and common costs to ensure that reasonably efficient
service providers have an opportunity to remain financially viable.
71. In some instances, mark-ups for access may be higher than mark-ups for end-user
prices for local service. This is because a local service provider's ability to sell access is
dependent upon having local service customers. So a local service provider would be willing
to have low prices for local service in order to be able to sell access.
72. See generally M. JAMISON, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR SUBSIDY-FREE PRICES USING
COOPERATIVE GAMES (1995), for an explanation of why it is generally true that all services
should make a contribution to joint and common costs.
73. E. NOAM, PRESENTATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SOCIETY SYM-
POSIUM ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES & INTERCONNECTION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF GAME THEORY TO
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1995).
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This principle conflicts with the efficient component pricing rule
(ECPR) which was developed by Baumol and Willig7 4 and is generally
supported by incumbent monopolies. The ECPR recommends that inter-
connectors pay incumbent monopolies their opportunity costs of intercon-
nection. In other words, interconnection prices would ensure that the in-
cumbent monopolies make the same amount of profit regardless of
whether there is competition.
The ECPR is inappropriate to use because it can result in high mark-
ups, and because it is based on several assumptions that often do not
match reality. These assumptions include: (1) there are no sunk costs and
no monopoly profits;75 (2) there is no discrimination against the intercon-
nector in price or quality of interconnection; (3) the margin between the
monopoly's input price and retail price reflects the monopoly's economic
costs of producing the retail product; 6 (4) the retail market is homogene-
ous; 77 (5) interconnectors are price takers; (6) regulators are able to per-
fectly regulate the monopoly;78 and (7) new competitors are more special-
ized than the incumbent monopoly.
7 9
D. Flexibility Policies
Carriers should be allowed flexibility to lower prices and introduce
more innovative price structures. One common form of price flexibility is
price bands - a policy where regulators allow companies to change prices
between a predetermined maximum price and a predetermined minimum
price. However, as long as maximum prices for access and non-competi-
tive basic telephone services do not contain high contributions to joint
and common costs, price floors should be unnecessary to facilitate effi-
cient competition." Therefore, carriers should be allowed to charge any
prices that are below the low-mark-up maximum price. It is also unlikely
that carriers could harm competition with alternative price structures as
long as the maximum price is not exceeded. As a result, carriers should be
allowed to also provide alternative price structures as long as the struc-
tures are non-discriminatory, especially in non-competitive access
74. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'L J. TRANSP. ECON. 341
(1983); Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULA-
TION 109-52 (H. Trebing ed. 1979).
75. Tye, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Response, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
203, 206, 210 (1994).
76. Kahn & Taylor, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Comment, 11 YALE
J. ON REG. 225, 227, 230 (1994).
77. Willig, supra note 74, at 138; M. Armstrong & C. Doyle, Access Pricing, Entry and
the Baumol-Willig Rule, Discussion Paper No. 9422, University of Southampton.
78. B. MITCHELL, W. NEU, ET. AL., THE REGULATION OF PRICING OF INTERCONNECTION
SERVICES 6-7 (1994).
79. Willig, supra note 74, at 139.
80. M. Jamison, When does Cross-Subsidy Make Business Sense? presentation at Tele-
communications Infrastructure and the Information Economy: Interactions Between Public






This paper describes: (1) why current access policies are inconsistent
with competitive markets; and (2) an alternative access structure that
could remedy these mismatches. The alternative access policies described
are based on four principles: (1) non-discrimination as to who the cus-
tomer is not what the customer does with the traffic; (2) modularity so
that regulators can easily change and remove pricing constraints; (3)
mark-ups of price above incremental cost that are low enough to limit the
potential for price discrimination and cross-subsidy, yet high enough to
keep service providers financially viable; and (4) price flexibility for ac-
cess providers.
In some instances, these policies are significantly different than the
status quo. Transitions will be necessary to allow customers and compa-
nies time to adjust."' These transitions could include: (1) price adjust-
ments and deregulation in other markets to allow companies to develop
new sources of revenues; (2) increased competition to allow customers to
choose among service providers and to encourage lower overall costs for
the industry; (3) phase-outs of old subsidy systems and phase-ins of new
systems; and (4) time for companies and customers to adjust.
Special accommodations may also be needed for rural areas. Costs in
these areas are generally high, and cost-based prices may be unaffordable.
Special subsidies for rural areas may be needed to ensure universal ser-
vice and the development of rural telecommunications infrastructures.
81. WEINHAUS, MONROE, ET. AL., supra note 69, at 1.
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